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ПЕРЕДАЧА И СОЗДАНИЕ ЗНАНИЯ В
СОВРЕМЕННОМ УНИВЕРСИТЕТЕ
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Белград, Республика Сербия
Аннотация: автор убежден, что в современ-
ном университете необходимо развивать нау-
ку как «теоризацию практик». Нам необходи-
мо признать нередуцируемую гетерогенность 
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социальных практик, что означает, что мы не 
должны больше замыкаться в образовательной 
или трансляционной практиках в пределах этой 
институции. Приводятся примеры того, как эта 
процедура работала в истории социальных и 
гуманитарных наук.
Abstract: the author suggests that it is necessary 
to develop science in contemporary University as 
«theorisations of practices.» We need to recognize 
the irreducible heterogeneity of social practices, 
which means that we no longer need to be closed in 
an educational or translational practices within this 
institution. Examples of this procedure realization 
in the history of social sciences and humanities are 
provided.
Ключевые слова: современный университет, 
социальные и гуманитарные науки, теоризация 
практик.
Keywords: contemporary University; social 
and human sciences; theorisations of practices.
I will speak about institution of University, and 
the present ambiguities that are being fomented and 
provoked around its status and within its practices.
For a long time, we have been living in the 
shadow of the Enlightenment, and we naively 
believed that knowledge is a value in itself. It 
was a very comfortable position for professionals 
of knowledge, what professors are. Even on 
occasions or in periods of ideological censorship, 
the censorship could not squarely say that this 
or that portion of knowledge should be deleted, 
should be omitted because it was ideologically not 
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adequate, but had to try to prove that ideologically 
inappropriate knowledge was no knowledge at all. 
So, by the logic of the things, we as specialists 
of knowledge even in those hard situations had a 
relatively comfortable position, and we definitely 
had an upper hand for the past 200 years.
This is no more the case. Knowledge is no 
more a self-evident value in itself. If for a long 
time the question that the university people and 
the governments were asking themselves was how 
to make as much knowledge as possible available 
to the largest number of people, the questions 
that are now posed are like the following: how 
much knowledge, for whom, how fast, what is 
the cheapest way. We can see this institutional 
questioning of old certainties all around us: new 
educational and research institutions are emerging 
outside the university, they are often more 
competitive than the old academic apparatuses, 
they offer fast courses, swift trainings, they focus 
on well-defined target groups, and their offer is for 
well-defined practical purposes. The university 
itself is not only under the pressure of outside 
competition, it has also imposed upon itself the 
governmentally prescribed self-reform. In the 
European Union right now, a huge continent-
wide university reform is going on, called the 
‘Bologna process’. It is cutting down the duration 
of the studies, it is trying to adapt the output of the 
university to the requests of the labour market, and 
it is also cutting down public funds available to 
public education. So we have good reasons to ask 
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ourselves about the purpose and the future of our 
basic activities and operations: the production and 
transmission of knowledge.
However, it would be hypocritical to consider 
that we only have to do that because of external 
pressures. There were at least two very strong 
challenges to the university and to knowledge 
that were coming from within. One was the 
criticism by the student movements in the 60s 
and the 70s, and the other was the theoretical 
critique developed by Michel Foucault and his 
followers. Both the students and Foucault were 
denouncing the academic knowledge for its part 
in the processes and practices of oppression and 
exploitation in contemporary society. But the 
interesting feature is that they were denouncing 
the academic institution and its knowledge for 
contrary reasons. For students, their knowledge 
was irrelevant, rigid, sterile, and archaic, and 
ultimately without practical application, except for 
its role in the reproduction of an obsolete institution 
– the University. For Foucault, knowledge was 
creating its own domains of application, its own 
relevance – it was too active, too greedy to catch 
subjects and to submit them. For the students, 
university knowledge was closed into ivory towers 
of academic elites; for Foucault it was active in the 
mechanisms of microphysics of power that reaches 
into every corner of our lives, our bodies, and our 
existence. The students denounced the ‘law and 
order’ ideology, the castration of life, the vampire 
and dead nature of school knowledge – while 
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Foucault, on the other side, kept warning: no, this 
is a knowledge which stimulates life, it models 
and regulates life, it controls large populations by 
the way of bio-politics.
After 30 or 40 years of this critique, it is time 
to take it seriously. Let us take a step back and 
ask ourselves about the logic of the development 
of the social sciences and the humanities. Maybe 
it is in this way that we can find a way out of the 
present situation, without necessarily falling into 
the pessimism of a scholar like Michel Foucault, 
or without having to make another revolution of 
1968.
A commission which was investigating the 
present state of the social sciences and whose 
chairman was Immanuel Wallerstein, our colleague 
in sociology, described the paradigm of social 
sciences in the following way:
There were three clear lines of cleavage in the 
system of disciplines erected to structure the social 
sciences in the late nineteenth century:
- the line between the study of the modern/
civilized world (history plus the three nomothetic 
social sciences) and the study of the non-modern 
world (anthropology, plus Oriental studies);
- within the study of the modern world, the 
line between the past (history) and the present (the 
nomothetic social sciences);
- within the nomothetic social sciences, the 
sharp lines between the study of the study of the 
market (economics), the state (political science), 
and civil society (sociology).
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Each of these lines of cleavage came to be 
challenged in the post-1945 world 5. P. 360
 What is interesting in that understanding of 
the social sciences is its Platonist dieretic scheme 
which we can graphically present in the following 
way:
Figure 1: The system of social sciences
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If we put it in this way, we see that sociology has 
a double status because it belongs both to the ‘bad’ 
line of history, anthropology, political science, and 
to the ‘good’ line of mathematised ‘exact’ (and 
ethnocentric) social sciences which culminate, 
of course, in economics. The institutionalized 
system of social sciences is the exact historical 
accumulation of failures to realize an ideal to which 
only economics to a certain extent approaches.
In 1706, a conservative social thinker, a 
professor of rhetoric at the Naples Royal University, 
Giambattista Vico, already noticed this internal 
clash within the sciences 3. In his view, there was 
a method which was developed by the Ancients, 
and this he called the topical method. Contrary to 
this age-old method, the Moderns were, as Vico 
acutely noticed, developing the method proposed 
by Mr. Cartesius, and this he called the modern 
critical method. This critical method is, of course, 
modelled upon the exact natural sciences, upon the 
Galilean physics. While the topical method takes 
its inspiration from the ancient rhetoric and the 
juridical science which both presume that things 
human always and by their very nature allow for 
differing and mutually exclusive descriptions that 
cannot be reduced to each other. Scrutiny of human 
affairs is a matter of perspective, of the point of 
view, of the places (topoï) from where one looks at 
them. In human affairs, the most one can strive for 
is, at least according to the Ancients, to find ways 
of co-existence and of the necessary co-operation 
among the irreducibly differing human positions.
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In early modernity, the topical method was 
recaptured and splendidly articulated within the 
new modern paradigm – the philological paradigm. 
Although it had produced important results, it has 
been disqualified by the advent of Galilean physics, 
and further marginalised by Cartesian philosophy. 
It was only during the nineteenth century that 
philology could again claim scientific dignity with 
comparative and historical linguistics and with the 
new social sciences. The development of linguistics 
led to Saussurian paradigm – the splendid effort of 
philology to incorporate the modern critical norm. 
Saussurian linguistics has demonstrated its force, 
and its limits, during the twentieth century. It now 
seems to be an obstacle, rather than an incentive to 
the theorisation of symbolic practices. 
Social sciences, on the other side, have been a 
compromise formation from the very beginning. 
As a consequence, their problem has been that 
their Galilean ideal has not corresponded to their 
object and to their practical preoccupations of 
knowing this object. That is why they have been 
repeating their attempts at a solution, and have 
repeatedly failed. This has been almost a necessary 
development of a compromise formation which 
arose when the paradigm of ‘the Humanities’, 
studia humanitatis that existed in the form of the 
septem artes liberales during the Middle Ages 
and that started really to flourish under humanism 
– when this traditional paradigm came under the 
attack of the modern paradigm introduced by 
the Galilean physics and its exact mathematical 
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method 4. 
At that moment the humanities broke down into 
one branch which is philology and which went its 
own way surviving as the study of language and 
its formations. While the other line, after having 
itinerated through centuries without much success, 
finally led towards the swift series of consecutive 
constitutions of sciences from the late 18th till 
the end of the 19th centuries, towards the series 
which resulted in the ‘system’ of social sciences, 
still dominating our institutions. That is why the 
scheme on the board (Figure 1) is systemic, not 
historical. Historically, the first social science to 
constitute itself was economics, and it was already 
the object of a critical scrutiny at the moment 
when anthropology only started its epistemic 
constitution. It is utterly simplifying to squeeze 
epistemic processes into chronological straight-
jacket. Still, there are coincidences that are 
noteworthy at least as mnemonic devices. Adam 
Smith published the founding book of economic 
science An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (1776) at the time when 
Johann Gottfried Herder was writing his first 
texts that were to infuse a new momentum into 
philological endeavours by investing them with 
the key importance for Nationalbildung (essays 
from ‘Über die Ursprung der Sprache’, 1770, to 
‘Über die Wirkung der Dichtkunst auf die Sitten 
der Völker in alten und neuen Zeiten’, 1778). In the 
same year 1859, when Karl Marx first made public 
his project of the critique of political economy, 
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Lewis Henry Morgan sent out his circular letter 
to collect data on kinship systems world-wide, 
containing his paper.
The last to emerge was sociology, with 
Durkheim and Année sociologique, at the end of the 
century – to complete the ‘system’. Sociology, the 
complementing supplement of the system, is also 
the social science which most obviously harbours 
both strands of the system, the mathematical-
statistical norm and the ambivalent, perspective-
dependent topical approach to human reality. In 
its microcosm, sociology reflects the unsolvable 
dilemma of the system as a whole, its driving 
force and its bad consciousness. It is in this field 
that may testify to the ultimate defeat of the social 
sciences, where I am involved as sociologist and 
where my achievements lay for which the Paissiy 
Hilendarski University has so generously awarded 
me the Doctorate Honoris Causa.
I have taken some time to show you the trap and 
the critical situation, and I will be much faster in 
proposing my solution, which is also the answer 
to the question what to do about the transmission 
and production of knowledge nowadays, in the 
contemporary situation.
My idea was to start from here, from the iterated 
bifurcation as the formal feature of the system of 
social sciences. There seems to be the root of the 
problem. Let me re-design this recurring split in 
general terms, not in its specific occurrences:
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Figure 2: the logic of the system
Constitutive opposition of the system is the 
opposition between the topical and the critical 
paradigms. The system is driven by the desire to 
achieve the critical ideal: at each of the consecutive 
attempts the system generates a new science which 
proves to be just another topical construction. And 
the machine starts again from the same opposition. 
This sedimentation of failures defines the field we 
call ‘social sciences’. 
The logic of the system presents as irresolvable 
the contradiction between the topical and the 
critical methods, so lucidly diagnosed by Vico 
three hundred years ago. However, it is not, 
as Vico imagined, a contradiction between the 
method of the Ancients and the method of the 
Moderns. Vico’s intuition and, to be frank, 
Wallerstein’s sophisticated systemisation are only 
savage theorisations of two types of practices. The 
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one is the predominantly technological practice 
directed toward the mastery over nature, while 
the other is the savage theorisation of practices 
that are operated within a human environment. 
I am actually falling back to the old Aristotelian 
distinction between the astral world where things 
are eternal and necessary, and the sub-lunar, human 
world where, as Aristotle wittily says, things can 
be such or other 1, where there is no knowledge of 
eternal and necessary laws because it is a world of 
production, of practice and decisions, of freedom. 
While here, at the other branch of the bifurcation, 
at the side of the ‘critique’, there is the astral world, 
the world where necessity and eternal laws are 
normally ruling. My son who is a physicist says 
that this is no longer true: but this does not affect 
my thesis.
My proposal is that we should shift from a 
savage theory to self-reflected theory and, to 
be very precise, to start conceiving theoretical 
preoccupations as theorisations of practices. We 
have several examples of precisely this procedure 
already in the history of social and human sciences. 
The one I will mention is Freud’s constitution 
of psychoanalysis. As you know, Freud and his 
colleague Breuer were practicing at the very 
beginning a therapeutic method which was called 
the cathartic method. The success of the cathartic 
method depended upon the patient’s falling in love 
with the therapist. So the therapeutic success of 
this method depended on its being unsuccessful as 
therapy, because a therapy which depends on the 
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patient’s love for the medicine man is, of course, 
not successful.
This posed quite hard ethical questions to 
Breuer and to Freud, and Breuer could not stand 
it and he gave up. Freud, on the other side, was 
a much more arrogant person, and he theorised 
this situation and invented the concept of 
transference. In Freudian psychoanalysis, the 
analysis is terminated only when the relation of 
transference is dissolved. And at this point we 
will again mobilise the conceptual tools provided 
to us by Foucault. In Foucault’s terms, Freud was 
occupying the position of medical authority onto 
which the truth of the patient is being alienated 2. 
In a traditional medical relation it is the medical 
doctor who tells the patient the truth about her or 
his illness. Freud’s ingenious insight was that by 
occupying the position of alienation of the truth 
he did not for this reason know the truth any more 
than the patient. The truth was in the discourse that 
was coming from the patient to the analyst, but in 
order to come to this truth Freud operated a topical 
shift, that is, he constituted the position of the 
therapist into the point from where the discourse 
of the patient bounces off and comes back to the 
patient as the truth of her or his unconscious.
So, to come to the point of my talk, what we 
need to do at the university today is to produce our 
sciences, our theories as theorisations of practices. 
What we need is the recognition of the irreducible 
heterogeneity of social practices, which means 
that we should no more remain closed into the 
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unique educational or transmission practice within 
the institution.
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Аннотация: лаборатория памяти как мето-
дологический проект намерена поделиться, 
адаптировать и экспериментировать на евро-
пейском уровне «Лаборатория памяти», лабо-
раторная модель межпоколенной деятельности 
(с участием учителей / преподавателей, студен-
тов и старших), направленная на обновление 
